Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. All rights reserved. This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following...
NAMEmac_test - MAC framework testing policy
SYNOPSISTo compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC options MAC_TEST
Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
and in loader.conf5:
DESCRIPTIONThe ifconfig policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC framework. Among other things, ifconfig will try to catch corrupt labels the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger. Additionally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various MAC framework entry points have been called is stored in the security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree.
Label FormatNo labels are defined for .
SEE ALSOmac(4), mac_biba4, mac_bsdextended4, mac_ifoff4, mac_lomac4, mac_mls4, mac_none4, mac_partition4, mac_portacl4, mac_seeotheruids4, mac(9)
HISTORYThe ifconfig policy module first appeared in Fx 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
AUTHORSThis software was contributed to the Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS'' ) as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
BUGSSee mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in Fx .
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.