mac_test (4)

Leading comments

Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
All rights reserved.

This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
DARPA CHATS research program.

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following...

(The comments found at the beginning of the groff file "man4/mac_test.4freebsd".)

NAME

mac_test - MAC framework testing policy

SYNOPSIS

To compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC options MAC_TEST

Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC

and in loader.conf5:

mac_test_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

The ifconfig policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC framework. Among other things, ifconfig will try to catch corrupt labels the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger. Additionally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various MAC framework entry points have been called is stored in the security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree.

Label Format

No labels are defined for .

SEE ALSO

mac(4), mac_biba4, mac_bsdextended4, mac_ifoff4, mac_lomac4, mac_mls4, mac_none4, mac_partition4, mac_portacl4, mac_seeotheruids4, mac(9)

HISTORY

The ifconfig policy module first appeared in Fx 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

This software was contributed to the Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS'' ) as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in Fx .

While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.