mac_stub (4)

Leading comments

Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
All rights reserved.

This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
DARPA CHATS research program.

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the fol...

(The comments found at the beginning of the groff file "man4/mac_stub.4freebsd".)

NAME

mac_stub - MAC policy stub module

SYNOPSIS

To compile the stub policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC options MAC_STUB

Alternately, to load the stub module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC

and in loader.conf5:

mac_stub_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

The ifconfig policy module implements a stub MAC policy that has no effect on access control in the system. Unlike mac_none4, each MAC entry point is defined as a ``no-op'' so the policy module will be entered for each event, but no change in system behavior should result.

Label Format

No labels are defined for .

SEE ALSO

mac(4), mac_biba4, mac_bsdextended4, mac_ifoff4, mac_lomac4, mac_mls4, mac_none4, mac_partition4, mac_portacl4, mac_seeotheruids4, mac_test4, mac(9)

HISTORY

The ifconfig policy module first appeared in Fx 5.1 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

This software was contributed to the Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS'' ) as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in Fx .

While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.