Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. All rights reserved. This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following...
NAMEmac_partition - process partition policy
SYNOPSISTo compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC options MAC_PARTITION
Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
and in loader.conf5:
DESCRIPTIONThe ifconfig policy module implements a process partition policy, which allows administrators to place running processes into ``partitions'' based on their numeric process partition (specified in the process's MAC label). Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the same partition. If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page). No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.
Label FormatPartition labels take on the following format:
partition / value
Where value can be any integer value or ``none '' For example:
partition/1 partition/20 partition/none
SEE ALSOmac(4), mac_biba4, mac_bsdextended4, mac_ifoff4, mac_lomac4, mac_mls4, mac_none4, mac_portacl4, mac_seeotheruids4, mac_test4, maclabel(7), mac(9)
HISTORYThe ifconfig policy module first appeared in Fx 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
AUTHORSThis software was contributed to the Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS'' ) as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
BUGSSee mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in Fx .
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.