Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. All rights reserved. This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following...
NAMEmac_ifoff - interface silencing policy
SYNOPSISTo compile the interface silencing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC options MAC_IFOFF
Alternately, to load the interface silencing policy module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
and in loader.conf5:
DESCRIPTIONThe interface silencing module allows administrators to enable and disable incoming and outgoing data flow on system network interfaces via the sysctl(8) interface.
To enable network traffic over other interfaces, set the sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled to 1 (default 0).
To allow BPF traffic to be received, even while other traffic is disabled, set the sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled to 1 (default 0).
Label FormatNo labels are defined.
SEE ALSOmac(4), mac_bsdextended4, mac_lomac4, mac_mls4, mac_none4, mac_partition4, mac_portacl4, mac_seeotheruids4, mac_test4, mac(9)
HISTORYThe policy module first appeared in Fx 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
AUTHORSThis software was contributed to the Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS'' ) as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
BUGSSee mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in Fx .
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.